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onducting a successful monetary policy 
presents real-world challenges, such as 
evaluating where the economy is, where it 
is going, and where it should be going. But 
how do monetary policymakers make decisions about 
the economy in a world with imperfect information? In 
his message this quarter, President Anthony Santomero 
discusses how policymaking is affected by both the 
availability and reliability of economic information.
I’d like to take this opportunity to 
share my thoughts on the difficult task 
of conducting monetary policy for the 
U.S. In particular, I would like to focus 
on how policymaking is affected by 
both the availability and reliability of 
information on how well the economy 
is performing. I want to emphasize that 
my message this quarter reflects my 
own thoughts on the subject and does 
not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Federal Open Market Committee. 
We all know that monetary policy 
responds to economic circumstances 
and hence to incoming economic data. 
Therefore, it is important every once 
in a while to take a closer look at what 
we know about the data we rely on 
and, simultaneously, what we do not 
know about the economy from the 
information that is available. 
However, this is more than a phil-
osophical discussion; after all is said 
and done, we must conduct monetary 
policy. So I would like to focus on what 
conducting real-time monetary policy 
is like in a world with less-than-perfect 
information about the economy we are 
attempting to affect. 
At the outset, I want to reinforce 
my view that appropriate monetary 
policymaking requires attention to 
long-run goals, not just short-term dy-
namics. Or to state it another way, our 
short-run actions must take account 
of our long-run objectives if we are 
to be prudent and successful central 
bankers. 
The most important long-run goal 
of good monetary policy is straight-
forward enough: a responsible central 
bank must guarantee price stability. 
Price stability is crucial to a well-func-
tioning market economy. Prices are 
signals to market participants. A stable 
overall price level allows people to 
see shifts in relative prices clearly and 
adjust their decisions about spending, 
saving, working, and investing opti-
mally. Inflation, by contrast, jumbles 
and distorts price signals and generates 
suboptimal economic decisions. 
For the past 25 years, the Fed has 
been relatively successful in achiev-
ing the goal of price stability. Equally 
important, as the relatively low level 
of market interest rates attests, we 
have succeeded in reducing long-run 
inflation expectations over the past 15 
years. 
Maintaining confidence in sus-
tained price stability is crucial to fos-
tering the most productive saving and 
investment decisions. In addition, it af-
fords the Federal Reserve considerably 
more latitude to take short-run policy 
actions to help stabilize economic per-
formance. 
As you all know, the Federal Re-
serve is charged with setting monetary 
policy so as to meet its dual mandate 
of maintaining price stability and en-
suring maximum sustainable output 
growth. When the economy is weak, 
monetary policy generally needs to 
be accommodative, and when the 
economy is growing strongly, policy 
needs to be tighter. In this way policy 
remains consistent with underlying 2   Q4  2005 Business Review  www.philadelphiafed.org
economic fundamentals. It is entirely 
appropriate and consistent with our 
long-term goals for monetary policy to 
be countercyclical as long as we remain 
cognizant of the inflationary environ-
ment. 
But we must all recognize that a 
central bank’s power is limited. One 
thing we have learned — and it has 
been an expensive lesson — is that 
the best the Fed can do is cushion the 
economy. It cannot in and of itself 
force stronger growth than the econ-
omy is capable of delivering. Trying to 
push an economy beyond its potential 
may temporarily accelerate growth, but 
it also creates imbalances and increases 
inflationary pressures that must be ad-
dressed, and so boom leads to bust. 
I believe that the Fed’s policy over 
the past 25 years has demonstrated 
both its commitment to, and the value 
of, a stable price environment. Look-
ing ahead, I am confident the Fed will 
take policy actions consistent with 
economic fundamentals and keep its 
focus on the long-run objectives. 
That said, I do not deny that con-
ducting a successful monetary policy 
presents plenty of real-world challeng-
es. It requires an evaluation of where 
the economy is, where it is going, and 
where it should be going. Therefore, 
the appropriate conduct of real-time 
monetary policy requires policymakers 
to gauge how strong or weak the econ-
omy is at any moment in time, what 
its most likely trajectory appears to be, 
and how that trajectory aligns with its 
long-run potential. 
This requires a detailed appraisal 
of data and, importantly, of real-time 
data on the current state of the econ-
omy. Unfortunately, these data often 
give very noisy signals of what is really 
going on. 
WHERE DO WE WANT THE 
ECONOMY TO GO?
So where does one start? A policy-
maker must first assess where he or she 
wants the economy to go. For the U.S. 
central bank, the goals of monetary 
policy have been made explicit in rele-
vant legislation. The Federal Reserve is 
to maintain price stability and ensure 
maximum sustainable output growth. 
The first challenge is to quantify 
each of these important objectives: 
What is the highest growth rate for 
output that is sustainable? What rate 
of unemployment represents full utili-
zation of labor? What rate of inflation 
represents price stability? These are 
tremendously difficult concepts to pin 
down. Economists have taken many 
different approaches to establishing 
numerical guideposts for economic 
performance, but, as I will illustrate, 
these guideposts are very difficult to 
estimate in practice. 
POTENTIAL OUTPUT 
There is general agreement in 
macroeconomics that the relevant 
measure of real activity for policy-
making is the so-called “output gap” 
between the level of actual output and 
an underlying level of potential output. 
This gap is important in that it not 
only provides an output objective, but 
it also provides information about pos-
sible future inflationary pressures. If 
the economy were to grow faster than 
the growth in potential output for a 
sustained period of time, inflation 
would be expected to accelerate over 
time. By contrast, economic growth 
slower than potential would lead to less 
than full employment. 
But what is this level of potential 
gross domestic product (GDP), and 
how fast does it grow? Recent theoreti-
cal work suggests that this notional 
benchmark should be the level of 
output that occurs when all wages and 
prices are flexible and the economy 
fully adjusts to balance supply and de-
mand in all markets. This is a reason-
able concept, but since not all wages 
and prices are flexible, this output 
level cannot be observed directly. So in 
practice, this level of potential output 
is impossible to measure. 
As a practical alternative, poten-
tial output is commonly interpreted to 
be the trend level of output. Unfortu-
nately, there are many different ways 
to estimate trend output, each with 
its own set of issues. Sometimes these 
estimates have strikingly different im-
plications for monetary policy. 
One reason that measures of po-
tential GDP are difficult to estimate is 
that many factors — demographic and 
technological among them — affect 
potential output in any given period. 
So, potential output changes over time 
and can only be roughly estimated 
given current conditions. 
For example, the “tech boom” of 
the 1990s, whose effects are still being 
analyzed today, has played a key role 
in determining U.S. potential output. 
However, the exact extent of the up-
ward shift it caused in potential GDP 
is still uncertain. As we all know, the 
technological revolution’s effect on the 
economy is still widely debated. Differ-
ent interpretations of its effects lead to 
different estimates of potential GDP. 
So with these difficulties in mind, 
how accurate have our estimates of po-
tential GDP been? According to many 
researchers both inside and outside of 
the Federal Reserve, the accuracy of 
contemporaneous measures of poten-
tial GDP is not encouraging. Compar-
ing current estimates of the gap for 
the period from the mid-1960s to the 
mid-1990s, one Fed researcher finds 
that more recent measures of the out-
put gap lie almost uniformly above the 
contemporaneous estimates: The real-
time estimates of potential output over 
this period were systematically overly 
optimistic.1 He points to the late 1960s 
1 See the article by Athanasios Orphanides and 
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as a particularly striking example. At 
the time, the data show that the gap 
between actual GDP and potential 
GDP was believed to be about zero. 
With the benefit of hindsight, almost 
any estimate now would place that 
gap at nearly five percentage points. 
Taken at face value, this divergence 
would imply that policymakers did not 
recognize the considerable upward 
inflationary pressure that the economy 
was subject to at that time. 
NAIRU 
Another construct that has found 
a place in countercyclical monetary 
policy is NAIRU, or the non-accelerat-
ing inflation rate of unemployment 
— the unemployment rate at which in-
flation remains constant. The NAIRU 
model predicts that when unemploy-
ment is below the NAIRU, there is 
pressure for the inflation rate to rise; 
on the other hand, when unemploy-
ment is above the NAIRU, there is 
pressure for inflation to fall. 
This, too, is a reasonable concept. 
Unfortunately, academic research 
has shown that estimates of NAIRU 
are very imprecise and are subject to 
significant standard deviations. Work 
by other economists suggests that this 
imprecision exists in models where 
NAIRU is presumed constant and 
in models that allow NAIRU to vary 
over time as well. This conclusion also 
holds up when we use alternative series 
of unemployment and inflation. The 
Philadelphia Fed’s Research Depart-
ment estimated that the NAIRU was 
between 3.4 and 5.9 percent between 
1983 and 2004 with a 95 percent con-
fidence level. This is a fairly wide band 
of uncertainty. 
The problem is that estimates with 
this level of imprecision are of limited 
use when conducting monetary policy. 
When policymakers are attempting 
to evaluate whether there is still slack 
in the labor market, or if any further 
decrease in unemployment may lead to 
inflationary pressures, it clearly would 
be preferable to have more precise es-
timates of NAIRU. For example, there 
are substantially different implications 
of a 5 percent unemployment rate if we 
believe NAIRU is 3.4 percent or if we 
believe NAIRU is 5.9 percent or even 
if it is at the midpoint of 4.7 percent. 
PRICE STABILITY 
The imprecision of our estimates 
goes beyond just real-sector economic 
statistics. Take, for example, price 
data. Price stability will be achieved, 
to paraphrase Federal Reserve Chair-
man Alan Greenspan, when inflation 
ceases to be a factor in the decision-
making processes of businesses and 
individuals. While this is a reasonable 
definition, it provides neither an exact 
estimate of our inflation goal, nor does 
it state which measure of inflation is 
most germane. 
In terms of the latter, the debate 
has two parts: First, which price in-
dex should be used? Second, which 
measure of that index best describes 
inflation in today’s economy? The two 
indexes most often cited as relevant 
measures of inflation are the consumer 
price index, or CPI, and the chain 
price index for personal consumption 
expenditures, or the PCE price index. 
Which is more useful from a policy-
maker’s perspective? 
While the CPI and PCE are simi-
lar measures, they do vary in several 
important dimensions. One important 
difference is the scope of the spending 
they cover. The CPI is designed to ap-
proximate a typical consumer’s cost of 
living and therefore covers direct out-
of-pocket expenditures of households. 
PCE, on the other hand, is a broader 
index that includes some consump-
tion that is government funded, such 
as Medicare and Medicaid, and some 
goods and services that are consumed 
without any explicit charge to the con-
sumer. 
Then there is the issue of whether 
to use a core measure of the chosen 
price index, that is, the price index 
excluding the food and energy sec-
tors, or to use the headline number. 
The argument in favor of using a core 
price index is that the energy and food 
sectors have tended to be the more 
volatile components of either index 
and that large volatility in monthly 
data often disappears over time. Of 
course, if the time horizon over which 
one is measuring inflation is long 
enough, it should not matter whether 
volatile components are deleted, since 
the noise in these components dis-
sipates over the long horizon. But with 
a shorter horizon, the core price index 
would give the best measure of under-
lying price movement. On the other 
hand, those who argue against using 
core price indexes believe that the 
volatile sectors are being systematically 
removed by using core measures and 
that these sectors may provide useful 
information about current and future 
price movement. 
I mildly favor the core PCE defla-
tor as my preferred measure of price 
inflation because it is a broader and 
more appropriate measure of underly-
ing inflation than the CPI. Also, it is a 
chain-weighted index, and so it takes 
According to many researchers both inside 
and outside of the Federal Reserve, the 
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account of consumers' changing buy-
ing patterns as relative prices change. 
Therefore, to me, it reflects changes in 
the overall price level more accurately 
than the CPI, which is based on a 
fixed basket of goods and services. Us-
ing the core PCE also helps reduce the 
"noise" in the inflation signal, enhanc-
ing its value as a monitoring device. 
IMPLICATIONS
Reading this, one might get the 
feeling that data problems loom so 
large in my mind that I have very little 
faith in – or use for – quantitative 
guideposts to economic performance. 
That would be taking my comments 
too far. These guideposts still contain 
important and relevant information for 
any policymaker. In fact, acknowledg-
ing their strengths and weaknesses 
enables one to better use these admit-
tedly imprecise estimates more effec-
tively. 
For example, if we look at the er-
rors in measuring the level of potential 
output and the output gap, we must 
recognize that these statistical prob-
lems can be large and important. How-
ever, if we look at the growth of output 
relative to trend growth we may find 
it a more reliable guidepost for policy 
evaluation because the errors in each 
may well be offsetting. 
This approach to policy suggests 
that policymakers may be better off 
looking at the growth rate of output 
relative to the growth rate of trend 
output and striving to achieve growth 
in aggregate demand approximately 
equal to the expected growth in poten-
tial aggregate supply. 
DETERMINING THE CURRENT 
STATE OF THE ECONOMY 
Thus far, I have discussed the 
difficulties policymakers face in deter-
mining where the economy should be, 
but the challenge of assessing where 
the economy actually is I consider only 
slightly less daunting. In truth, current 
economic conditions are not easy to 
measure accurately in real time. We re-
ceive data only with a lag, and prelimi-
nary data are notoriously unreliable. In 
short, the data about the current state 
of the economy are constantly chang-
ing. History and recent events have 
shown these changes, at times, can be 
large. 
Estimations and Imputations. 
At the heart of this problem is that 
data releases on the current state of 
the economy are often a collection of 
sampling, estimation, and imputation. 
We recognize the first of these — we 
do not count every item produced or 
every good sold — but the other is-
sues surrounding the timely release 
of data have also proven to be quite 
important. There is a tradeoff here. To 
be timely, government agencies usually 
issue preliminary numbers before all 
the underlying information is avail-
able. Consequently, data available to 
policymakers concerning the current 
state of the economy are often based 
on estimations and imputations of 
data. As more complete information 
becomes available, agencies regularly 
revise their data series, and the revi-
sions can be significant. 
For example, the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA), the government 
agency that issues GDP data, releases 
its first report on the nation’s GDP near 
the end of the month following the 
end of a quarter. That release is called 
the advance report. At the time of 
the advance report, the BEA does not 
have complete information, so it makes 
projections about certain components 
of GDP from incomplete source data. 
As time goes on, the source data be-
come more complete. But it usually is 
not until the following year that better 
information, such as income-tax records 
and economic census data, is available. 
So the GDP data undergo a continual 
process of revision. 
Benchmark Revisions. Once in 
a while we make substantial changes 
in addition to regular revisions of the 
data. About every five years, the gov-
ernment makes major changes, called 
benchmark revisions, to the data for 
the national income and product ac-
counts. Benchmark revisions incor-
porate new sources of data and may 
also include changes in definitions of 
variables or changes in methodology. 
To be sure, these changes are neces-
sary, in part because our economy is 
constantly changing: Different types 
of products enter the market and dif-
ferent accounting methods need to be 
used. But they can be disruptive. 
For example, a major alteration 
undertaken in the 1999 benchmark 
revisions changed the way the BEA 
classifies computer software purchased 
by business and government. Prior to 
the revision, this type of spending was 
counted as an office expense. This was 
adjusted in 1999, and now this type of 
spending is counted as investment. 
The most recent benchmark revi-
sion took place in 2003, and it incor-
porated several new pieces of informa-
tion and more reliable source data and 
used a new price index in nonresiden-
tial construction that takes account 
of changes in quality. Again, these are 
important changes, but they disrupt 
what we know or thought we knew. 
The Real-Time Data Set. At the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
we take these data revisions very seri-
ously. We have developed a data set 
that gives a snapshot of the macroeco-
nomic data available at any given date 
in the past.2  We call the information 
set available at a particular date a vin-
tage, and we call the collection of such 
2 The data set is available to the public on 
the Philadelphia Fed’s website at: www.
philadelphiafed.org/econ/forecast/reaindex.
html. See also the two articles by Dean 
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vintages a  real-time data set. Using 
the real-time data set one can pick a 
point in history and see exactly what 
data policymakers had at their disposal 
at that time. 
For example, suppose we were to 
look at the growth rate of real output 
for the first quarter of 1977. The first 
time real output for that quarter was 
reported, the national income and 
product accounts showed that real 
output grew 5.2 percent — that is the 
reading in our May 1977 vintage of 
the real-time data set. Over time, this 
estimate was updated and changed as 
better and more accurate data on that 
quarter became available. Today, when 
we look at the national income and 
product accounts, the growth rate of 
real output for the first quarter of 1977 
is listed as 4.9 percent. 
Importance of Data Revisions. 
Now that we have established that 
data revisions occur, the logical next 
question is how significant are the re-
visions to our understanding of current 
economic conditions. Not surprisingly, 
revisions in any particular quarter can 
be substantial, but in addition, our re-
search suggests that these benchmark 
revisions can go on for some time 
and significantly alter our view of the 
economy over longer periods.3 
For example, consider the infla-
tion rate from 1975 to 1979 as mea-
sured by the PCE deflator. In 1995, 
the data showed inflation averaging 
7.7 percent over that period. But it 
was subsequently revised down to 7.2 
percent in the 1999 benchmark revi-
sions of the data. Similarly, real output 
growth from 1955 to 1959 was as low 
as 2.7 percent in the 1995 benchmark 
vintage of the data but as high as 3.2 
percent in the 1999 benchmark vin-
tage. 
In short, our real-time data set in-
dicates that data are revised extensive-
ly over time, and subsequent vintages 
of the data may paint a much different 
economic picture than earlier vintages. 
For my purposes here, I would point 
out that our real-time data set allows 
us to see exactly what the economy 
looked like to policymakers at the time 
they made their decisions. Are there 
episodes where the data available to 
policymakers in real time indicated 
they were in a much different situation 
than the subsequently revised data 
show they were? I believe there are. 
As Dean Croushore and Tom 
Stark pointed out, consider the situ-
ation in early October 1992.4 Today’s 
data tell us the economy was in pretty 
good shape in late 1992. Real output 
grew 4.2 percent in the first quarter, 
3.9 percent in the second quarter, and 
4.0 percent in the third quarter. But if 
you read accounts from that time, poli-
cymakers were clearly worried about 
whether the economy was recovering 
from the recession, and they were 
contemplating actions to stimulate the 
economy. Why were policymakers so 
worried? According to the data avail-
able to them, the economy had grown 
just 2.9 percent in the first quarter and 
1.5 percent in the second quarter. Sta-
tistics for the third quarter had not yet 
been released, but forecasts suggested 
that economic growth had not picked 
up much from the second quarter’s 
anemic 1.5 percent. In addition, a 
number of monthly indicators pointed 
to a decline in the economy. Later, 
many of these indicators were also re-
vised up significantly. The point is that 
policymakers assessing their situation 
in October 1992 saw themselves in a 
much weaker economic environment 
than we now know they were. 
ANOTHER EXAMPLE — THE 
SAVING RATE 
Let me offer another example that 
has more contemporary relevance. Ear-
lier this year, we made public several 
new variables in the real-time data 
set. Two variables of particular inter-
est are personal saving and disposable 
income. These variables are especially 
interesting because these data lead to 
the saving rate in the national income 
accounts. The personal saving rate is 
defined as personal saving divided by 
disposable personal income. 
Recently, there has been a lot of 
talk about today’s low personal sav-
ing rate in the U.S. Many economists 
have worried that the low personal 
saving rate may signal an impending 
slowdown in consumption growth and 
a precursor to a decline in aggregate 
demand. In light of this discussion, it 
is interesting to ask: How good is our 
measurement of the current saving 
rate? 
An examination of the historical 
data by two of our researchers, Tom 
Stark and Leonard Nakamura, shows 
that the subsequent revisions in the 
average saving rate and its variation 
over time suggest that the saving rate 
3 See the working paper by Dean Croushore 
and Charles L. Evans, and the one by Leonard 
Nakamura and Tom Stark. 
In short, our real-time data set indicates that 
data are revised extensively over time, and 
subsequent vintages of the data may paint a 
much different economic picture than earlier 
vintages. 
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looks very different today than it did 
20 years ago.5 For example, the per-
sonal saving rate, according to today’s 
statistics, peaked on an annual basis in 
the early 1980s. Back then, however, 
the early 1980s did not appear to be 
a time of high saving. As reported in 
the second quarter of 1980, the first-
quarter 1980 personal saving rate was 
3.4 percent, the lowest since 1950 and 
down from a peak of 9.7 percent in the 
second quarter of 1975. By contrast, 
the first-quarter 1980 saving rate is 
now reported to be 9.5 percent, and 
much of the revision has been fairly 
recent. Over the course of time, it 
was revised upward by 6.1 percentage 
points. 
The problem with saving data for 
early 1980 was not that exceptional. In 
fact, the average saving rate between 
1965 Q3 and 1999 Q2 has been revised 
up by 2.8 percentage points over time. 
The revision process typically has been 
upward and surprisingly large. 
Why such large revisions? Person-
al saving is the difference between two 
aggregates: disposable personal income 
and personal outlays. These two series 
are collected from distinct bodies of 
data. Disposable personal income is 
the largest component of gross domes-
tic income, which includes retained 
corporate income, government income 
from taxes and other sources, and capi-
tal consumption. These income data 
are collected from payroll data, Inter-
nal Revenue income tax filings, and 
corporate profit reports. Personal out-
lays are almost entirely due to personal 
consumption expenditures, the largest 
component of GDP. These data are 
collected from the revenues of retailers, 
service suppliers such as hospitals and 
hotels, and so forth. 
Among the immediately available 
data, the more complete and reliable 
data are on the demand or product 
side; this is the source of GDP. Income 
side data are aggregated to gross do-
mestic income, conceptually the same 
as GDP, but in practice differing by as 
much as 2.3 percent — the so-called 
statistical discrepancy. Typically, in-
come is undercounted. All this sug-
gests that our measure of the saving 
rate is both somewhat suspect because 
of substantial measurement error and 
subject to substantial revision. In fact, 
large variations in personal saving 
across time have typically been revised 
away. 
Will this happen again? We do 
not know for sure, but the contention 
that the current low estimate of the 
personal saving rate implies that con-
sumption in the future will rise more 
slowly may be incorrect, as benchmark 
revisions may well result in a substan-
tial upward revision in the current 
estimate. This is a good example of the 
difficulty experienced when a policy-
maker is forced to respond to data that 
traditionally have been significantly 
revised. 
MONETARY POLICY IN THIS 
ENVIRONMENT OF IMPERFECT 
INFORMATION 
We have established the fact 
that information about our goal of 
monetary policy is imprecise and our 
understanding of current economic 
conditions is imperfect; what is a poli-
cymaker to do? Put another way, what 
are the implications of these real-world 
uncertainties and imperfections in 
information for the proper conduct of 
monetary policy? 
More Real-World Evidence. Here 
I can offer a few observations. The first 
of these is that we must remember that 
we live in a data-rich environment. 
There are many pieces of economic 
data that can be examined when mak-
ing policy decisions, and no one piece 
of data ought to get too much weight. 
As my examples indicate, when data 
are measured imprecisely, putting too 
much emphasis on any one number 
can lead to problems. 
Second, it should be remembered 
that some of the imprecision fades with 
time. As I have said many times before, 
high frequency data tend to be highly 
volatile and subject to substantial revi-
sion. A policymaker must look at avail-
able data in a broad context. 
In this most recent business 
cycle, employment was very slow to 
come back to pre-recession levels. As 
a result, a lot of emphasis was being 
put on the monthly payroll growth 
numbers. When a good value was 
reported, people would assert that the 
labor market had finally returned to 
solid growth; when a bad number was 
reported, people grew concerned. The 
fact is that the standard error for the 
one-month change in payroll num-
bers is nearly 70,000, and making too 
much of any one monthly number is 
ill-advised. Given all the data issues, 
it is important not to overemphasize 
short-term deviations while ignoring 
long-term trends. 
Third, it is important not to focus 
exclusively on quantitative data. Our 
interpretation of the numbers must 
be nuanced by real-world experience. 
As a Reserve Bank president I gather 
information from around my District 
and around the country. I believe it is 
of crucial importance to have ties and 
open communication with leaders in 
the worlds of business and finance. We 
need insight from both Main Street 
5 See the working paper by Nakamura and 
Stark.
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By moving slowly, policymakers have time 
to assess the effects of their actions on the 
economy and update their views on what 
further action needs to be taken. 
and Wall Street when trying to un-
derstand the underlying dynamics of 
the aggregate economy. I also listen to 
reports from my board of directors on 
how they see the economy performing 
in their sectors. In addition, the Phila-
delphia Fed has set up several advisory 
councils and ad hoc roundtables that 
meet for the sole purpose of discuss-
ing how the members of these bodies 
see the economy progressing and the 
current state of price pressures in the 
economy. 
If I see some small signs of infla-
tion coming through in the data and 
I hear from these contacts that they 
are raising their prices and they are 
constantly facing higher input prices, 
those small signs of inflation would be 
more of a concern than if my contacts 
were not reporting evidence of price 
pressure. 
This type of touch and feel of the 
marketplace is of great import and is 
one of the benefits of the decentral-
ized structure of the Federal Reserve 
System. The fact that there are 12 
Reserve Banks allows us to gather a 
large amount of regional intelligence 
that adds depth to our understanding 
of current economic conditions. 
A CASE FOR GRADUALISM 
Beyond all this, the fact that there 
is uncertainty surrounding the state of 
the economy and new economic infor-
mation becomes available on a nearly 
continuous basis supports the notion 
that it makes sense for policymakers to 
move in a slow and cautious manner. 
William Brainard, the well-known 
Yale economist, made the case for 
gradualism in a classic article that 
is now about a half century old.6 He 
suggested that policymakers should 
be conservative in light of this lack 
of complete information, meaning 
that their policy responses should be 
attenuated. In fact, he argued that 
policymakers operating in a world of 
uncertainty should compute the direc-
tion and magnitude of their optimal 
policy response and then do less. 
This type of attenuated policy 
action has several intuitive benefits. 
First, it guides the economy in a par-
ticular direction but probably will not 
allow policymakers to overshoot the 
goal. Second, by moving slowly, policy-
makers have time to assess the effects 
of their actions on the economy and 
update their views on what further ac-
tion needs to be taken. As Chairman 
Greenspan has explained, monetary 
policymaking is risk management. The 
case for gradualism rests on the assess-
ment that the cost of taking too large 
of an action is larger than the cost of 
taking too small of an action. 
However, the story does not end 
here. While it is true that moving in a 
gradual manner reduces the chances 
of overshooting with all its attendant 
costs, the policymaker cannot afford 
to be consistently behind the curve. 
Given that monetary policy affects the 
economy with long and variable lags, 
there is a chance that by acting in this 
attenuated fashion, we will undershoot 
the optimal policy stance. This can be 
at least as costly as overshooting. Our 
challenge is to weigh these costs and 
respond appropriately to the data and 
attendant risks involved. 
Our experience during the most 
recent business cycle underscores 
the need to be flexible in choosing 
the speed with which we respond to 
unfolding economic developments. 
This was a cycle noteworthy for the 
uncertainties surrounding it and the 
large number of shocks that occurred 
along the way. In the months following 
the sharp stock market decline, it was 
unclear how rapidly economic activ-
ity was decelerating. Once it became 
clear, the Federal Reserve responded 
aggressively, ultimately cutting the tar-
get federal funds rate to a record low 1 
percent. On the other side, in light of 
the pattern of recovery and expansion, 
the Federal Reserve has taken a gradu-
alist approach to removing the mon-
etary accommodation and returning to 
a more neutral policy stance. 
TRANSPARENCY 
Because the Fed must respond to 
incoming information differently in 
different situations, the Fed must com-
municate the rationale for its actions 
as clearly as possible in order to main-
tain public confidence in its commit-
ment to its long-run goals 
Of course, this openness has 
been an important aspect of recent 
monetary policy. The FOMC has been 
moving toward increased transparency 
for some time, and its communica-
tion with the markets has improved 
greatly over the past decade. Informa-
tion about the Fed’s policy goals, its 
assessment of the current economic 
situation, and its strategic direction are 
increasingly part of the public record. 
Recently, the Federal Reserve 
has also taken action to expedite the 
release of the minutes from the FOMC 
meetings. Just this year, the FOMC 
began releasing the minutes of each 
meeting prior to the next meeting. The 
minutes not only report our decisions 
concerning immediate action but also  6 See the article by William Brainard.8   Q4  2005 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
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our sense of the key factors driving 
near-term economic developments and 
the strategic tilt to our actions going 
forward. 
The goal of all these steps toward 
increased transparency is to inform 
markets about where the FOMC sees 
the economy today and where it thinks 
the economy is headed in the future. 
This is hopefully useful information 
that will improve the markets’ under-
standing of our view of the economy 
and offer them insights into the direc-
tion of possible future policy actions. 
All of these actions are steps in 
the right direction. It is important 
for the FOMC to be as open as pos-
sible. My hope is that by providing 
relevant information about our view 
of the economy and our current areas 
of concern, our actions will be more 
transparent and surprises will be the 
exception rather than the rule. With 
the benefit of hindsight, I think we can 
say that we have come a long way in 
this regard, as the list of changes I just 
offered you suggests. 
CONCLUSION
In this message, I have tried to 
convey to you some of the challenges 
monetary policymakers face because 
they operate in a world of imperfect 
information. 
Given our mission, the lagged 
effect of our policy actions, and the 
inevitable imprecision with which an 
economy as large and complex as ours 
can be measured, these challenges will 
not go away. So we must find ways to 
meet them. 
Some of the problems I have 
outlined suggest that we often must 
rely on our theoretical knowledge of 
economics as we make decisions that 
affect the economy. 
In addition, data gathered from 
our regional contacts are also of value 
in this process, even while the national 
data change shape with the arrival of 
new information that leads to their 
revision. There is value in listening 
and gathering the perspectives of our 
Reserve Bank boards of directors, 
advisory councils, and other regular 
contacts in our Districts. 
Another part of the solution is 
to take care in choosing the pace at 
which we act and react to incoming 
data. Gradualism has a role to play in 
monetary policy, but not at the ex-
pense of falling behind the curve. 
The last solution mentioned here 
is transparency and increased com-
munication with market participants. 
Communication is an important part 
of the solution to operating in the real 
world of imperfect information. The 
increased transparency that has been 
the hallmark of the Greenspan Fed is 
an important part of optimal monetary 
policy in a world of uncertainty. 
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